A DECISIVE FACTOR FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE FORMULA

PROTOTOKOS + PASIES KITISEOS = PARTITIVE GENITIVE

Luis C. Reyes originally penned this challenge in a summarized form to post on the Greek Theology discussion board, moderated by Edgar Foster, one of Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Mr. Foster did not approve the original message, stating that he felt this topic had been thoroughly discussed already on the board.  Mr. Reyes felt that though he had discussed this topic on other boards, it had not been addressed on Greek Theology.  In any event, with Mr. Reyes’ permission, I am posting his challenge here.  If anyone would like to respond to Mr. Reyes, he or she may contact For an Answer here. The original message has been expanded and incorporated with additional information that was not included in the original challenge.

Abstract

In this short article I challenge the notion that the ancient koine Greek term prototokos intrinsically possessed a partitive semantic value encoded in its linguistic form. Some advocates of the “partitive word” view, for instance Wes Williams, have proposed that the proper interpretation of prototokos pasies kitiseos ( Col 1:15 ) can be obtained by pure linguistic decoding of the formula: prototokos (partitive word) + pasies kitiseos (genitive construction) = partitive genitive construction (i.e., the prototokos is included in the class of creation). Theological conclusion: The Son is a part of creation. While I do not agree with the theological conclusion drawn from such a linguistic formula, my point of contention here is purely a linguistic one. In fact, the entire argument hinges on the critical issue of whether or not the isolated linguistic component prototokos possesses an intrinsic partitive semantic value. From the perspective of modern linguistics and cognitive pragmatics, I argue that it is perhaps impossible to prove that an isolated linguistic component (such as prototokos) can convey an intrinsic partitive semantic value. As a result, I argue that the entire formula proposed by Williams be abandoned, since there has been no linguistic evidence to substantiate the “partitive word” view with prototokos, which is critical for the application of the formula as a whole.

INTRODUCTION

There have been many who have spent a great deal of time attempting to obtain the proper interpretation of Col 1:15, specifically the phrase prototokos pasies kitiseos. Some who have understood prototokos to be a part of creation have understood the genitive of the whole construction to be a partitive genitive. Debate has arisen with encounters with people of the Jehovah’s Witness persuasion on various Internet forums over this issue. Here I will only focus on refuting one particular aspect of the argument that has apparently received much prestige and assurance among some Jehovah’s Witnesses. This argument has come to be known to me as the “partitive word” argument, and—to the best of my knowledge—Wes Williams first proposed it after refining a similar argument originally proposed by Rolf Furuli.[i]

1. WES WILLIAMS, ROLF FURULI AND THE PROTOTOKOS/PARTITIVE WORD ARGUMENT

Williams has attempted to appeal to the notion that prototokos is intrinsically a “partitive word” in order to understand the proper interpretation of the grammatical construction prototokos pasies kitiseos in Col.1: 15. According to Williams in over 70 passages in the LXX every time the word appears in the genitive (excluding metaphorical uses) it always includes the prototokos in a particular class. Wes has stated:

I posted on this board about two years ago every non-metaphorical instance in the LXX where it occurs with a genitive (or “of a “) phrase.  What the examples show is that the PRWTOTOKOS (“firstborn”) is a PART of the group.[ii]

With the data obtained from his analysis of prototokos and its uses in the LXX, Williams has concluded that prototokos and its genitive pasies kitiseos in Col 1:15 must necessarily be a partitive genitive. Williams also concludes from his analysis that prototokos must necessarily possess an intrinsic partitive semantic property. In fact, in August of 1998, in a post arguing against Dr. Robert Keay,[iii] Williams stated his proposed argument as:  

I have been through all the occurrences of PRWTOTOKOS in the LXX. I present the following usage for proof behind my point: 27 examples of partitive genitive (the firstborn is a part of the group): Gen 4:4; 25:13; Ex 11:5; 13:13,15; 22:28; 34:19,19; 34:20, 20; Num 3:40, 41, 41;3:45, 46, 50; 8:16; 18:15, 15; Deut 12:6, 17; 14:23; 15:19; Neh 10:37, 37; Ezek 44:30. 42 examples of possessive genitive, such as `my son`,implying membership of the group of sons: Gen 49:3; Ex 4:22; 4:23; 6:14;11:5; Num 1:20; 18:17,17,17;26:5; Deut 21:15,16,17; 33:17;Judg 8:20;2 Sam 3:2; 2 Sam 13:21; 1 Kings 16:34; 1 Chr 1:29; 2:3,13; 2:25,25,27,42,50; 3:1,15; 4:4; 5:1,3; 8:1,30,38,39; 9:5,31,36,44; 26:2; Psalm 134:8; Mica 6:7; Jer 38:9 There are no example [sic] of other genitives. Lexical semantics, therefore, sans theology, give one meaning to PRWTOTOKOS, and this meaning is intrinsically partitive. Philologically speaking, all genitives with the word uphold the partitive meaning.[iv]

Now before discussing any of the content of this citation there are a few other things that need to be mentioned. First, it appears that William’s argument noted above was possibly taken from another discussion forum where Rolf Furuli actually originated the argument. In fact, in March of 1997 (almost half a year prior to Williams citation above), Furuli posted:

I have been through all the occurrences of PRWTOTOKOS in the LXX with the following results. 27 examples of partitive genitive: Gen 4:4; 25:13;Ex 11:5; 13:13,15; 22:28; 34:19,19; 34:20, 20; Num 3:40, 41, 41; 3:45, 46, 50; 8:16; 18:15, 15; Deut  12:6,17; 14:23; 15:19; Neh 10:37, 37; Ezek 44:30. 42 examples of possessive genitive, such as `my son`, implying membership of the group of sons: Gen 49:3; Ex 4:22; 4:23; 6:14;11:5; Num 1:20; 18:17, 17,17; 26:5; Deut 21:15, 16, 17; 33:17; Judg 8:20; 2 Sam 3:2; 2 Sam 13:21; 1 Kings 16:34; 1 Chr1:29; 2:3, 13; 2:25, 25, 27, 42.50; 3:1, 15; 4:4: 5:1, 3; 8:1 ,30 ,38 ,39; 9:5, 31, 36, 44; 26:2; Psalm 134:8; Mica 6:7; Jer 38:9. There are no example [sic] of other genitives. Stage I: Lexical semantics, therefore, sans theology, give one meaning to PRWTOTOKOS, and this meaning is intrinsic partitiv [sic]. Philologically speaking, all genitives with the word uphold the partitive meaning.[v]

The point I wish to make here is not that William’s comments are similar to Furuli’s, but rather that this “partitive word” argument with prototokos (as it is described above) was possibly first originated by Furuli, since it predates William’s comments.[vi] Now, while Furuli does not explicitly say that prototokos is a so-called “partitive word,” he does state however (as does Williams), that lexical semantics give ONE meaning to prototokos, which they both say is “intrinsically partitive.”[vii] 

Also, elsewhere Furuli notes that although he does not object to the use of the phrase, “a partitive word” in a descriptive way, he does nonetheless argue that the very lexical meaning of prototokos makes the term a part of the whole. This means for Furuli that prototokos intrinsically conveys a partitive semantic value:

While I am not aware of a formal linguists use of the term “a partitive word,” I do not object to using it in a descriptive way. I do not say it is wrong to use this expression, I just say it is not a standard linguistic expression. The lexical meaning of certain words imply a certain relationship to other words, such as “shepherd” and “flock”, “king” and “queen”, “salt” and “pepper” etc. While such relationships are not “semantic”, they give strong indications of the meaning of grammatical relationships that generally are ambiguous, such as Greek genitive […] The English first-born means “one who is born first”, and the Greek word PRWTOTOKOS is used throughout the LXX and the NT with the same meaning; there is no example of a different lexical meaning. So the use of PRWTOTOKOS implies the existence or possible existence of a group of creatures of the same kind as the one who is PRWTOTOKOS. When we have a genitive relationship between PRWTOTOKOS and such a “group” word, the genitive is partitive. The very lexical meaning makes the word a part of the whole in such a situation.[viii]

This is a notion that is often clearly repeated among advocates of this view. For instance, Williams has also explicitly stated, “The word PRWTOTOKOS (`firstborn`) is a partitive word. It has an intrinsic partitive force.”[ix]  In another place Williams has further stated:

The key to bear in mind is that the partitive word PRWTOTOKOS (firstborn) lexically requires that the firstborn be a part of the group. This is a direct statement that Christ is part of the “creation” in Col 1:15. This is clear, powerful, and fully lexically supported by the LXX![x]

Therefore, the first premise of this argument is that prototokos possesses an intrinsic partitive semantic value inherent in the isolated word. According to Williams this partitive force “lexically requires that the firstborn be a part of the group.” However, the argument is expanded when this factor is combined with a genitive construction to produce a working linguistic formula for Williams.

2. THE FORMULA FOR PROPERLY UNDERSTANDING PROTOTOKOS PASIES KITISEOS.

Williams writes, “Theology aside, I think the grammar of PRWTOTOKOS + genitive is inescapable for a partitive genitive or genitive of relation.”[xi]  Hence, Williams has proposed the below listed formula for the proper interpretation of prototokos pasies kitiseos (Col 1:15):  

Prototokos/ partitive word

+

Paseis kitiseos/ genitive construction

=

Partitive genitive construction as a whole

(Figure 1)

A critical linguistic variable is overlooked in the argument: To the best of my knowledge, no one has ever presented a shred of linguistic evidence to support the notion that the isolated linguistic component prototokos is intrinsically a so-called partitive word (possessing an intrinsic partitve semantic value on its own), and certainly, no linguistic evidence has been demonstrated for the notion that prototokos “lexically requires that the firstborn be a part of a group.” It would seem that such an interpretation might be derived from the extra-linguistic context or from pragmatic implicature (although I even dispute that), but where is the linguistic evidence to substantiate such a claim of an intrinsic semantic partitive value inherent in the linguistic component prototokos?

This is very important because if the proper formula for interpreting Col 1:15 is: prototokos (partitive word) + pasies kitiseos (genitive construction) = partitive genitive construction, then demonstrating that prototokos is a so-called, “partitive word” is a critical variable for the validity and application of the formula to Col 1:15 (then one would have to consider the entire argument as a whole). In fact, in order to even begin applying this formula to Col 1:15 , advocates of this view first need to provide linguistic evidence that the isolated prototokos is a so called “partitve word” to begin with. The proposed linguistic formula is meaningless without linguistic justification for this critical element in the formula. If advocates of this view first cannot establish linguistically that prototokos is a so-called “partitive word,” then the entire argument collapses because it does not meet its own specifications and criteria for the proposed linguistic formula for interpretation.

3. A CHALLENGE TO PRODUCE LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE FOR THE CLAIM

(a). It should be noted that my objection is strictly a linguistic one. Since I question the notion for the existence of an intrinsic partitive semantic value in an isolated linguistic component (it is an assumption that first needs to be proven), then advocates of the “partitive word” view first need to provide some kind of statement of the methodological procedures that they have utilized which have lead them to identify an intrinsic partitive semantic value in the isolated linguistic component, prototokos. I am not asking for evidence from the micro pragmatic or extra linguistic context. Neither am I asking for linguistic evidence from the grammatical-syntactical context involving a string of other linguistic items. Since it is argued that prototokos conveys this intrinsic partitive semantic value, it is specifically this term for which I am requesting evidence. Hence, if there is any such linguistic evidence it must be demonstrated from the lexical semantics of the isolated term.

(b). It must clearly be articulated if this so-called partitive force is determined to be intrinsic in the isolated linguistic component itself, or if it is transported and conveyed over to the linguistic item prototokos as an implicature from either the pragmatic, extra linguistic context, or from any other outside influence. Notice, if it is argued that the partitive force is conveyed over to the linguistic term as an implicature, this does absolutely nothing to prove the notion that prototokos conveys an intrinsic parititve semantic value standing on its own. If this were the case the entire proposed linguistic formula collapses.

(c). If it is argued that the partitive force is determined to be intrinsic in the isolated encoded linguistic form of prototokos, advocates of this view are required to demonstrate from the isolated encoded linguistic form such intrinsic semantic value or property. How was this partitive semantic value determined and measured? What methodology was used to determine this intrinsic partitive semantic value so that others can replicate the procedure? If the procedures were legitimate and scientific (of course I am presupposing the scientific study of language here), then perhaps others can also reach similar results by utilizing the same methodology. One would expect that there would be some scientific procedure used to substantiate the view that prototokos possesses an intrinsic partitive semantic property. That is of course if a scientific approach to answer the question can even be applicable to this issue to begin with. Incidentally, Furuli has attempted to utilize scientific principles for linguistic analysis of the biblical texts. The back cover of Furuli’s book reads:

In the natural sciences, a basic principle is to break everything down to the smallest possible units and then study each unit. In linguistics and in the study of the biblical languages, a similar principle was followed with the word as the basic unit, but from the middle of this century the view has developed that the smallest units which were meaningful for translation had to be the sentence or even the paragraph. The author believes that the pendulum has swung too far in one direction, and that it still is meaningful to work with the word as the fundamental unit of translation.[xii]

I am of the opinion that a scientific method and approach, as the one Furuli’s work advocates, cannot be adequate to test the validity of the partitive word argument. While Furuli’s main concern above deals with translation, the principle that it is meaningful to work with the word provides no scientific support for the notion that prototokos conveys an intrinsic partitive property. The reason is because science focuses on either confirming or disproving a testable body of knowledge. But how does one test and confirm or disprove whether prototokos intrinsically conveys a so-called partitive semantic value inherent in its linguistic form? Science can certainly be described as a critical set of research methods designed to describe and interpret empirically perceived phenomenon. In fact, the scientific method possesses certain defined principles, such as the employment of methods of systematic empiricism. As noted, it also holds the concept that in order for something to be tested by science, it first must be a problem that is empirically solvable, and that it is capable of yielding testable theories. It is critical for the scientific method that its aim center solely for knowledge that is publicly verifiable and that it be open to verification or rejection by the process of replication. However, it seems to me that the notion that prototokos conveys an intrinsic partitive value is categorized as something that is non-testable, and hence out of the reach of scientific investigation. The notion that prototokos conveys an intrinsic partitive semantic value appears to be a problem that is not falsifiable, and thus is unlikely to be altered or shown to be false. Therefore, the burden is on those who advocate this position. This is precisely the reason why I have requested advocates of the partitive word view to prove their case from the isolated term. From a purely linguistic perspective, no linguistic evidence has been provided from the lexis itself to substantiate the notion that prototokos intrinsically conveys a partitve semantic value of which one can decode something like, “firstborn of a class.” It is critical to note that the “of a class” portion is not information linguistically encoded in the linguistic component, but rather if it is conveyed in a particular context, it may be understood from extra-linguistic or pragmatic implicature. Such an implicature may certainly be understood from a purely pragmatic perspective. However, this does nothing to prove the assumption that it was derived from the intrinsic isolated linguistic component itself. This is something that needs to be substantiated linguistically, and indeed, this is the basis of my entire criticism of the partitive word argument. I believe that the partitive word notion cannot be substantiated linguistically without crossing over into pragmatics and extra linguistic interpretation. Consequently the formula proposed by Williams does not fulfill its own criterion because it lacks this critical element.

(d). Partitive word advocates should note that I am not referring to the micro pragmatic and extra linguistic context for evidence for their claim that prototokos conveys an intrinsic partitve property. Rather I am centering precisely on the isolated Greek linguistic component prototokos. In order to answer these questions it is critical to note that the context and micro pragmatic context cannot be used, including the immediately preceding or following grammatical linguistic markers. The reason is because the partitive force or value may actually be leaking over to the term prototokos as an implicature from outside influence. That is, such a semantic partitive force may actually be conveyed from non-linguistic influence (implicature), and not from a linguistically intrinsic partitive property in prototokos itself. To advocates who argue that prototokos is inherently a “partitive word,” other contexts where prototokos also appears (e.g.’ the instances in the LXX) cannot be used to argue their position (that prototokos is intrinsically a partitive word). Why? The reason is simple: Advocates who argue this position first need to determine that it was not the context in all those other instances (anything going beyond the encoded linguistic item at issue) that conveyed that partitive element (implicature) over to the word each and every time it appeared. If that were the case, “prototokos” would not be an intrinsic “partitive word,” linguistically, since it would be the context in all those instances that would allow it to be; that is, “the partitive use of a word” (pragmatics), which is something quite different than “the use of a partitive word” (lexical semantics). It should be noted that the “partitive word” argument does not center on pragmatics or contextual interpretation, but rather on an appeal to the intrinsic properties of the linguistic item itself. The argument is presented as if there were some support from lexical semantics to substantiate this claim. This is a claim that I have requested linguistic evidence for, and a claim for which no linguistic evidence has been produced

(e). Hence, in order for advocates of this view to prove their position, they first need to isolate the linguistic component before analyzing its intrinsic semantic properties. Indeed, this approach is also in accord with Furuli’s own endorsed method of linguistic analysis for translation, where, as in the natural sciences, “a basic principle is to break everything down to the smallest possible units and then study each unit.”[xiii] In fact, for those who argue that prototokos intrinsically conveys an inherent partitive semantic value, this isolating approach is the only procedure which can possibly guarantee adequately isolating outside contamination from pragmatic contextual influences, and this would be theoretically ideal for examination. Of course, the problem is that on the other hand (aside from the scientific problems involving such a feat, see section (c) above), the notion that the word is the minimal unit of communication provides no support for the partitive word view either. Hence, it would seem that the task of attempting to prove that the isolated component prototokos possesses a so-called partitive semantic property intrinsic in its linguistic form is a futile endeavor. From a different angle, if one were to argue that the micro pragmatic context conveys a partitive force (implicature) over to prototokos, then this would simply be begging the question, since that would already assume (without proving) that the entire genitive phrase prototokos pasies kitiseos is a partitive genitive to begin with. Also, as noted already, this would not prove that prototokos conveys a semantically intrinsic partitive force. Now, even granting that a particular word is used in a legitimate partitive genitive construction (even if it occurs over 70 times), I still fail to see how that would demonstrate linguistically that the isolated word itself possessed an intrinsic semantic partitive value. This is clearly confusing lexical semantics with pragmatics. Thus, if there really is pure linguistic evidence that such a partitive semantic property existed intrinsically in prototokos, then it must be demonstrated from the term in isolation. I do not believe that it can be done, and this is the challenge that I pose to advocates of this view.

Notes

---

 [i] However, Furuli (1999: 252) notes that Nigel Turner’s comments may understand and describe a partitve sense of prototokos, although this does not lead Turner to conclude that the prototokos was included in a class of created beings. Turner writes, “Might it not be a partitive genitive? ‘Among all created things.’ I would retain the manifest meaning of prototokos ‘firstborn’—but in the sense that the Messiah was said to be firstborn—and interpret the word closely identifying Christ with the family of which he is head, i.e., the whole of creation which looks eagerly for redemption. It has a parallel in the epistle to the Romans where St. Paul again described him as a new Adam, closely identified with believers as an Archetype of a fresh stage or leap forward in the collective evolution of all the creatures of God, in the onward march towards the goal of achieving what Christ is himself—the ‘icon of the invisible God.” (Nigel Turner, Grammatical Insights into the New Testament (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1965, p. 124). However, from a purely linguistic perspective, no linguistic evidence is provided from the lexis itself to substantiate the notion that prototokos intrinsically conveys a partitive semantic value (see section 3 c).

[ii] Retrieved June 14, 2003 from the World Wide Web: 

http://www.forananswer.org/Mars_Jw/RG-WW.Col1_15.htm

 [iii] For information on the interaction between Dr. Robert Keay and Wes Williams see the below listed web page:  Retrieved June 14, 2003 from the World Wide Web: 

http://www.forananswer.org/Top_JW/Keay.Col1_15.htm

[iv] Retrieved June 14, 2003 from the World Wide Web: 

http://jehovah.to/exegesis/logs/firstborn.htm

[v] Retrieved June 14, 2003 from the World Wide Web: 

http://www.ibiblio.org/bgreek/archives/97-03/0242.html.

[vi] Although some, for example Peter Kirk, have noticed that there seems to have been entire chunks of information actually lifted from Furuli’s original post and then passed off as William’s own original material and research. This would naturally lead one to question whether or not Williams himself conducted this research which he says he conducted since the words in his post are apparently not his own. Retrieved June 14, 2003 from the World Wide Web: 

https://mail.kastanet.org/Lists/Bible-Translation/Message/28513.html.

[vii] In fact, in Nov of 1998 Furuli also stated that the English “firstborn” was “a partitive word”: “There can be little doubt that, if not an important theological question were involved, the genitive would be taken as partitive, because ‘firstborn’ is a ‘partitive’ word. . .” Retrieved June 14, 2003 from the World Wide Web:

http://funsite.unc.edu/bgreek/test-archives/html4/1998-11/28363.html

[viii]  Retrieved June 14, 2003 from the World Wide Web:

https://mail.kastanet.org/Lists/Bible-Translation/Message/28549.html

[ix] Retrieved June 14, 2003 from the World Wide Web: 

http://jehovah.to/exegesis/logs/firstborn.htm

[x] Retrieved June 14, 2003 from the World Wide Web: 

  http://groups.yahoo.com/group/greektheology/message/1986

[xi] Retrieved June 14, 2003 from the World Wide Web:

 http://www.ibiblio.org/bgreek/test-archives/html4/1997-02/17331.html

[xii] Rolf Furuli, The Role of Theology and Bias in Bible Translation with a special look as the New World Translation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Huntington Beach, Ca: Elihu Books, 1999)

[xiii] Ibid.

Robert M. Bowman, Jr.

Since 2000, a particular claim concerning biblical Greek grammar known as “Smart’s rule” has been circulating on the Web. This rule is thought by its advocates to prove that in John 20:28 Thomas must have been speaking of two persons and not one when he said “My Lord and my God!” That is, the rule supposedly proves that Thomas was speaking of Jesus as his Lord but of the Father as his God.

Oddly enough, I cannot find any exposition of the rule from Smart himself. Mr. Smart appears to be Martin Smart, who was and, I presume, still is a Jehovah’s Witness. Beyond that I have no information about Mr. Smart and have not seen anything in writing from him presenting or defending his own rule.

Most of the references to Smart’s rule on the Web appear on a listserv known as B-Greek, in its archived discussions from late 2000 and early 2001 (http://www.ibiblio.org/bgreek/). Awhile ago, on a listserver that I used to moderate, one of the list members touted Smart’s rule as superior to Sharp’s rule, which is a well-known and much-discussed rule of Greek grammar.

Defining Smart’s Rule

The writer who actually presented and defended Smart’s rule on B-Greek was a Jehovah’s Witness named Dan Parker. Here is how he defined the rule:

“In native [not translation] KOINE Greek when the copulative KAI connects two substantives of personal description in regimen [i.e. both or neither have articles] and the first substantive alone is modified by the personal pronoun in the genitive or the personal pronoun is repeated for perspicuity [Winer 147-148;155] two persons or groups of persons are in view.”  Dan Parker, “Re: John 20:28 and Smart’s rule. Correction,” B-Greek listserv, 2/1/2001 ;

http://www.ibiblio.org/bgreek/test-archives/html4/2001-02/4231.html (bracketed material in original).

Note that Smart’s rule as given by Parker actually covers four types of constructions:

Article + Substantive + Pronoun + kai + Article + Substantive + Pronoun

Substantive + Pronoun + kai + Article + Substantive + Pronoun

Article + Substantive + Pronoun + kai + Article + Substantive

Substantive + Pronoun + kai + Article + Substantive

It does not matter whether the pronoun precedes or follows the substantive.

The way that Smart’s rule is worded, it may seem to be qualified in such a way that it need not apply to all texts using the third and fourth constructions (i.e., those that do not repeat the pronoun “for perspicuity”). However, from Parker’s contention that the rule proves that John 20:28 is speaking of two persons, I infer that what he (and presumably Smart) mean is that whenever the pronoun is repeated with the second substantive the repetition is for the sake of perspicuity and that in all such cases the second noun still refers to someone different than the first substantive.

According to Parker, then, the rule has no exceptions in biblical Greek when the following conditions are met:

1. The text is not translation Greek (i.e., the Greek OT is entirely excluded).
2. There are two substantives of personal description joined by KAI.
3. Either both substantives have an article or neither of them has one.
4. Either the first substantive alone, or both substantives, are modified by a personal pronoun in the genitive (i.e., texts in which neither is so modified, or in which the second substantive alone is so modified, are not included).

The Repetition of the Pronoun

As already noted, in constructions thought to be governed by Smart’s rule a pronoun in the genitive case must be attached to the first substantive and may be attached to the second substantive “for perspicuity.” I am not sure why this qualification is attached since Parker and others who endorse the rule seem to think that it applies to any text in which the pronoun is repeated with the second substantive.

As stated, the rule refers to a few pages in Winer to document this idea of the repetition of the pronoun for perspicuity. The fact is that Winer was not referring to a doubling of the same pronoun or even necessarily the use of two pronouns. Rather, he was speaking of the use of a pronoun that in some sense is redundant but is used because the antecedent is already several words or more distant:

4. A repetition of this pronoun (autos), and also of the other personal pronouns, occurs,

a. When subjoined for the sake of perspicuity, in sentences where the principal noun is followed by a number of other words…. In the majority of these passages a participial construction, equivalent to an independent clause, precedes; in this same case even the Greek authors often add the pronoun [citing Pausanius, Herodotus, Plato, et. al.]….

[G. B. Winer, A Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament prepared as a solid basis for the interpretation of the New Testament, 7th ed., enl. and improved by Gottlieb Lünemann, rev. and authorized translation (Andover: W. F. Draper, 1897), 147-48.]

The NT texts that Winer cites as examples of his point often do not even use two pronouns. Instead, they use a pronoun to refer back to an antecedent substantive that is far enough back in a somewhat complex sentence structure, so that the pronoun helps to make the antecedent clearer:

“The people who sat in darkness have seen a great light, and to those who were sitting in the land and shadow of death, a light has dawned to them [autois]” (Matt. 4:16).

“Now when he had gone out to the entrance, another woman saw him [auton]…” (Matt. 26:71).

“Therefore, the one who knows the good thing to do and does not do [it], to him [autô] it is sin” (James 4:17 ).

In Winer’s other examples, sometimes two pronouns are used and they are the same (Acts 7:21 , auton…auton; Col. 2:13, humas…humas; Rev. 6:4, autô…autô), sometimes the two pronouns are of different cases (Mark 5:2, autou…autô [Winer has autô…autô]; Mark 9:28 , autou…auton; Matt. 8:1, autou…autô), and in a couple of instances it is hard to tell which pronoun Winer meant (Matt. 5:40; Phil. 1:7). None of Winer’s examples are examples of what is called Smart’s rule.

As best I can tell, then, Winer’s treatment of the pronoun used for perspicuity has no bearing or relevance to Smart’s rule.

Alleged Examples of Smart’s Rule

In one of his posts to B-Greek, Dan Parker offered the following lists of examples of texts fitting Smart’s rule. This same list has appeared verbatim elsewhere, notably on a web site defending Jehovah’s Witness doctrine (“An Online Response to a Kevin Quick Defender.”  The website where this article originally appeared has been taken down.  As of Aug. 2005, it is available for purchase at the following site:  http://www.geocities.com/yhwhbible/main.htm)

Possessive pronoun repeated for perspicuity (21) – (Mt 12:47,49; Mk 3:31 ,32 ,33 ,34 ; 6:4 7:10 ; 8:20, 21 Lu 8:21; Jn 2:12; 4:12; Ac 2:17; Ro 16:21 ; 1Th 3:11 ; 2Th 2:16 ; 1Ti 1:1; 2Ti 1:5; Heb 8:11; Re 6:11) [Heb 1:7 is a LXX quote and is therefore translation Greek.]

Single possessive – both substantives anarthrous (10) – (Mk 3:35; Ro 1:7; 1Co 1:3; 2Co 1:2; Ga 1:3; Ep 1:2; Php 1:2; 2Th 1:1,2; Phil 1:3)

Single possessive pronoun – both substantives arthrous (12) – (Mk 6:21; 10:7,19; 16:7; Lk 2:23; 14:26; 18:20; Jn 11:5; Eph 6:2; Ac 7:14; 10:24; Re 11:18)

This is the only list I have been able to find of alleged examples.

Before going any further, some corrections to the list of verse references are needed. The first paragraph appears to cite Mark 8:20, 21, followed by Luke 8:21, but in fact the first two references should be to Luke 8:20, 21 (so that the next one is actually a repeat). There are thus only 20 verses listed in the first paragraph. In the second paragraph, “Phil 1:3” is a reference to Philemon 3. In the third paragraph, the first reference in Luke should be to Luke 2:33, not 2:23 .

Next, in the interest of giving Smart’s rule every chance, we should take note of other texts that appear to fit its parameters successfully. I have found a few other such references: Matthew 12:50; 13:55 ; and John 19:25.

We have, then, 42 references listed by Dan Parker (not 43, since he accidentally counted Luke 8:21 twice), plus three more references, for a total of 45 NT references (to my knowledge) that have been or might be cited as examples of Smart’s rule.

The Semantics of Conjoined Substantives

The first question that needs to be asked about these example texts is whether there would be any possibility of the substantives being understood as referring to a single referent regardless of the articles or pronouns attached to them. The answer in most of these texts is an unequivocal no. The semantic relation between the substantives alone is enough to make their different referents unambiguous.

In 26 of our 45 examples, the substantives include terms designating family relationships that must be held by different individuals. These include:

·      6 texts that speak of a person’s father and mother (Mark 7:10 ; 10:7, 19; Luke 2:33 ; 18:20 ; Eph. 6:2)

·      12 texts that speak of a person’s mother, brothers, and sisters (Matt. 12:47 , 49, 50; 13:55 ; Mark 3:31 , 32, 33, 34, 35; Luke 8:20 , 21; John 19:25 ).

In addition, the texts include references to the following:

·      sons and daughters (Acts 2:17 )

·      Timothy’s grandmother and mother (2 Tim. 1:5)

·      one’s father, mother, wife, children, brothers, and sisters (Luke 14:26 )

·      Jesus (referred to as “he”) and his mother, brothers, and disciples (John 2:12 )

·      Jacob (“himself”), his sons, and his cattle (!) (John 4:12)

·      Martha, her sister, and Lazarus (John 11:5)

·      Jacob his (Joseph’s) father and all his relatives (Acts 7:14 )

·      Cornelius’s relatives and friends (Acts 10:24 )

Since it is impossible for any of these texts to be referring to a single individual, or even to be using the conjoined plural nouns to refer to the same group (since one’s sons cannot also be one’s daughters or one’s cattle, for example!), these texts cannot tell us anything as to the possible semantic significance of the placement of the possessive pronouns with regard to the nouns not having the same referent.

Twelve of the remaining examples refer to God the Father and to Jesus Christ (Rom. 1:7; 1 Cor. 1:3; 2 Cor. 1:2; Gal. 1:3; Eph. 1:2; Phil. 1:2; 1 Thess. 3:11; 2 Thess. 1:1, 2; 2:16; 1 Tim. 1:1; Phm. 3). All but two of these (1 Thess. 3:11 ; 2 Thess. 2:16 ) occur in a Pauline salutation, and all but one (1 Tim. 1:1, which has “God our Savior and Christ Jesus our hope”) uses essentially the same wording: “God our Father and [the] Lord Jesus Christ” (note the slight variations in the two non-salutation examples). In all 10 of the salutation examples, the two compound noun groups are anarthrous. The style and setting in Paul’s letters in all of these 10 examples fits the usual Greek opening of a letter at that time, in which good wishes were passed along from the letter writer’s companions closest to the recipients (“Ted to Mary. Cheers from Dad and Bill. We wish you were here.”) Even if we didn’t already know that God our Father was someone different from the Lord Jesus Christ, we would know simply by reading these salutations in their context that the two were different referents. The use or nonuse of the pronoun “our” to modify “Father” would make absolutely no difference in how these salutations would be read.

This leaves only seven examples of constructions supposedly governed by Smart’s rule. That isn’t much on which to base a rule of grammar. But let’s look at these remaining texts to see what evidence they might yield in support of Smart’s rule.

Weak Support for the Rule

In Mark 6:4, Jesus says, “A prophet is not without honor except in his hometown and among his relatives and in his household.” There are two reasons for questioning whether this text fits the parameters of Smart’s rule at all. First, the terms “hometown” (patris) and “household” (oikia) do not describe persons in the way that “relative” (sungenês) does. Rather, they refer to entities composed of persons. I am unsure whether Smart’s rule could be extended to include such substantives, assuming the rule were valid. Second and more telling, the three nouns are not simply connected by kai, as Smart’s rule assumes, but are parts of three prepositional phrases using en (“in,” “among”) connected by kai. That having been said, in this instance we do not have terms referring to separate referents. Jesus’ statement proceeds from the largest unit (his hometown) to a subset of that unit (his relatives) to a subset of that unit (his own family or household).

Mark 6:21 speaks of Herod’s “leaders and the commanders and the leading men of Galilee .” These do appear to be three distinct groups of men, and so this text apparently does fit Smart’s rule.

In Mark 16:7, the angel at the tomb tells the women to tell “his disciples and Peter.” Of course, Peter was one of Jesus’ disciples, so here again, as in Mark 6:4, the second term is a subset of the first.

In Romans 16:21, Paul writes, “Timothy my fellow worker greets you, and also Lucius and Jason and Sosipater, my kinsmen.” Grammatically, Paul connects the four proper names together with kai; the expression “my fellow worker” is in apposition to “Timothy” and the expression “my kinsmen” is in apposition to the other three names. This text, then, is a dubious example of Smart’s rule.

Hebrews 8:11 is a quotation from the Greek Old Testament, and so according to Parker’s definition cannot be used in support of Smart’s rule. That is probably just as well, since the substantives are arguably synonyms: “And they shall not teach everyone his fellow-citizen [politên] and everyone his brother [adelphon]….” In this context “brother” probably means something like “fellow countryman.” At any rate, the two nouns do not refer to separate groups.

Revelation 6:11 refers to “their fellow servants and their brothers who were about to be killed just as they had been.” In this text the martyred believers in Christ are told to rest while others are martyred for their faith just as they had been. These others are described as “their fellow servants [sundouloi] and their brothers [adelphoi].” Since all believers are considered servants of Christ and brothers of one another, the two nouns here refer to the same group. Therefore, this text appears to be a fairly clear counterexample to Smart’s rule. Furthermore, it is a text in which the possessive pronoun is repeated, as in John 20:28.

Finally, Revelation 11:18 the time is said to have come for God to reward “your slaves the prophets and the saints and those who fear your name” (tois doulois sou tois prophêtais kai tois hagiois kai tois phoboumenois to onoma sou). God’s servants the prophets are presumably a subset of the saints, and indeed of those who fear God’s name. It is also likely that the saints are identical with those who fear God’s name. This text, therefore, does not seem to fit Smart’s rule very well, and may be at least partially contrary to Smart’s rule.

Of these seven texts, only one clearly fits what Smart’s rule claims (that the two substantives have different referents), namely, Mark 6:21 . Romans 16:21 probably is irrelevant because the two substantives qualified by possessive pronouns are in apposition to proper names and are not strictly speaking in regimen with each other. In all of the other texts, the two or three substantives are either synonymous or one substantive is a subset of the other. Revelation 6:11 is a reasonable clear counterexample to Smart’s rule.

More Counterexamples to Smart’s Rule

So far I have found two more clear counterexamples to Smart’s rule.

2 Corinthians 8:23. “As for Titus, he is my partner and fellow worker among you [koinônos emos kai eis humas sunergos]….”Note that the nouns “partner” (koinônos) and “fellow worker” (sunergos) both explicitly describe the same person, namely, Titus. This text, then, is a clear counterexample to Smart’s rule.

Philippians 2:25. “But I thought it necessary to send to you Epaphroditus, my brother and fellow worker and fellow soldier (ton adelphon kai sunergon kai sustratiôtên mou), who is also your messenger and minister to my need (humôn de apostolon kai leitourgon tês xreias mou).”Remarkably, in this one verse we have an illustration of Sharp’s rule in the first half of the verse and a clear counterexample of Smart’s rule in the second half of the verse. The noun string ton adelphon kai sunergon kai sustratiôtên perfectly fits Sharp’s rule. The second noun string describing Epaphroditus, humôn de apostolon kai leitourgon tês xreias mou, fits the syntax structure of Smart’s rule (possessive pronoun—noun—kai—noun, with the two anarthrous nouns in regimen), yet the nouns both have the same referent. Therefore, this text also is a clear counterexample to Smart’s rule.

Conclusion

Smart’s rule finds all of its support in texts where the two or three nouns in regimen must have different referents because of the semantics of the nouns in question (e.g., father and mother, or mother and sons). In texts where this is not the case, more often than not the nouns do not have separate referents. Sometimes the referents are overlapping, or one refers to a subset of the other noun; and sometimes the referent is identical.

The bottom line is that the presence or absence of a possessive pronoun has no bearing on the exegesis of phrases in which two or more substantives are connected by kai. Where the substantives are in regimen (all having the article or all lacking the article), the meaning of the terms in context is the only real consideration in determining whether the substantives have one or more referent. In texts where the substantives used are generally synonyms, as in John 20:28 (“Lord” and “God”), the presumption should be that they have the same referent unless the context explicitly indicates otherwise.

A Response to Jehovah’s Witness Claims about Proverbs 8:22

Robert M. Bowman, Jr.

Jehovah’s Witnesses argue that in Proverbs 8:22 “Wisdom” claims to have been “created” by Jehovah, and since God’s attribute of wisdom was not created, “Wisdom” in Proverbs 8:22 must be a created being– whom they identify as the prehuman Son of God. Is this really a correct understanding of Proverbs 8:22?

I would say not; let me explain. First, in Proverbs 8, the description of wisdom as being the first of God’s works, or as having been “created” (8:22 in the Septuagint, or Greek Old Testament) before everything else, is part of an extended poetic passage in which wisdom is personified. Personification, of course, is a figurative use of language and is misread if taken literally. We know that the language is personification if we read the passage in light of its preceding and following contexts. Wisdom takes her stand by the city gates and cries out to those who pass by (8:1-3). She dwells with prudence (8:12); I have always wanted to know who she was! She has unlimited riches and bestows them on whoever loves her (8:18-21). She promises blessing to those who watch daily at her gates and doorposts (8:34). She builds a house with seven pillars and invites the men passing by to a party with wine and women (9:1-5)!

Only by extracting Proverbs 8:22-31 from its surrounding context could anyone mistake the description of wisdom as a literal description of an actual existing person. The meaning of the passage is not that God literally procreated (or created, LXX) someone called Wisdom before he created anything else. The meaning is that God “had” wisdom and established it as foundational to the created order before he actually made anything in our physical universe. Proverbs 8:22-31 is essentially a more elaborate statement of Proverbs 3:19-20 using the literary device of personification.

Please don’t misunderstand me. I don’t deny that the words of Proverbs 8:22 can in some way apply to Christ. Proverbs 8:22 is part of a biblical description of wisdom, and Christ can in some sense be called wisdom, so some sort of correlation or application is plausible. But this does not mean that Christ is literally speaking about himself in Proverbs 8, or that whatever is said about wisdom may be applied directly and literally to Christ.

Let me illustrate my point with another statement in Proverbs 8. Obviously we could extract certain lines from Proverbs 8, like “wisdom is better than jewels” (v. 11a), and say that such statements are literally true. Indeed they are, shorn of their context. But what is the point of that statement? Is its point, in context, that Christ is better than jewels? Although “Christ is better than jewels” is a true enough statement, that is not the point of Proverbs 8:11a in context. Rather, the point is that we would be better off cultivating the attribute of wisdom than pursuing material wealth. We KNOW this to be the point because the exact same statement was made earlier in a passage that is indisputably talking about cultivating the attribute of wisdom:

“How blessed is the man who finds wisdom And the man who gains understanding. For her profit is better than the profit of silver And her gain better than fine gold. She is more precious than jewels, And nothing you desire compares with her.” Proverbs 3:13-15

Compare the above passage with Proverbs 8:11a in context:

“Take my instruction and not silver, And knowledge rather than choice gold. For wisdom is better than jewels, And all desirable things cannot compare with her.” Proverbs 8:10-11

It would be hermeneutical suicide to argue that wisdom in Proverbs 3:13-15 is the attribute of wisdom while wisdom in Proverbs 8:10-11 is the person of Christ. Yet in Proverbs 3 wisdom is not personified, but is rather described poetically and metaphorically as a possession to be pursued and prized above all material things (see also Prov. 2:3-4).

Again, so that I am not misconstrued, I will repeat that both comments about wisdom can be secondarily, indirectly applied to Christ insofar as we know from other Scriptures that he embodies wisdom. Specifically, Christ embodied the perfectly wise person who puts truth, wisdom, knowledge, and understanding above personal material gain. One might even go so far as to say, quite correctly, that a relationship with Christ is more important than material things. Yet it remains true that this is not the point of the passage; it is not something the passage teaches.

Now consider Proverbs 8:22 again by comparing it with another parallel statement from Proverbs 3:

“Jehovah by wisdom founded the earth, By understanding he established the heavens. By his knowledge the deeps were broken up And the skies dripped with dew.” Proverbs 3:19-20

Unless we are willing to go even further out on a limb and argue that understanding and knowledge are also hypostatizations in this passage, “wisdom” here must refer to the attribute of wisdom. And since we have already seen that Proverbs 3 and Proverbs 8 parallel each other considerably, the conclusion that Proverbs 8:22-31 is an expanded reiteration of Proverbs 3:19-20, utilizing an extended personification, is essentially certain.

Of course, we learn from the New Testament that Christ was active in creation, and it is possible to see some correlation or thematic connection between that New Testament teaching and what Proverbs 3 and Proverbs 8 say about the role of wisdom in creation. But it does not follow that one can derive specific teaching about Christ from Proverbs 8. Neither Proverbs 3 nor Proverbs 8 is referring to Christ. What they say about wisdom may be applied in a secondary, indirect way to Christ only insofar as we have explicit teaching from the New Testament. To take selective words from Proverbs 8 and interpret them as referring to some specific event pertaining to the Son of God, such as his alleged origin in time, is hermeneutically unjustifiable.

Let me back up and say something more about personification. The Wikipedia gives an excellent definition of the literary practice of personification:

“Personification is a term used in literature to name the figure of speech which involves directly speaking of an inanimate object, or an abstract concept, as if it were a living entity, often one with specifically human attributes.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personification

This definition must be carefully distinguished from another use of the word “personification,” in which a person who embodies or fully displays an abstract quality or characteristic is said to “personify” that attribute (e.g., “Fred Astaire was elegance personified”). In this sense of the word “personification,” a real person is said to “personify” an attribute. In the literary sense, an attribute is “personified” by being spoken of as if it were a real person when it is not. These are two different linguistic phenomena and should not be confused.

In Proverbs 8, wisdom is “personified” in the sense that it is spoken of as if it were a person when in fact it is not. Even the Watchtower has at times recognized this fact:

“Personification is another figure of speech. We use this when we speak of something inanimate as if it were alive. For example, the Bible tells us, ‘Death ruled as king from Adam down to Moses’; ‘grief and sighing must flee away’; ‘true wisdom itself keeps crying aloud in the very street.’ (Romans 5:14; Isaiah 35:10; Proverbs 1:20) Death, grief, sighing and wisdom cannot really rule, flee or cry out. But speaking as if they did, the Bible paints vivid mental pictures, easily visualized and remembered.” “The Bible’s Vivid Figures of Speech,” _Watchtower_, 6/1/1984, 19, bold emphasis added.

The above definition is quite correct, and the examples given are apropos, including wisdom in Proverbs 1:20. Similarly, the publication _Insight on the Scriptures_, in its article on Spirit, has this to say:

“However, it is not unusual in the Scriptures for something that is not actually a person to be personalized or personified. Wisdom is personified in the book of Proverbs (1:20-33; 8:1-36); and feminine pronominal forms are used of it in the original Hebrew, as also in many English translations. (KJ, RS, JP, AT) Wisdom is also personified at Matthew 11:19 and Luke 7:35, where it is depicted as having both ‘works’ and ‘children.’ The apostle Paul personalized sin and death and also undeserved kindness as ‘kings.’ (Ro 5:14, 17, 21; 6:12) He speaks of sin as ‘receiving an inducement,’ `working out covetousness,’ `seducing,’ and `killing.’ (Ro 7:8-11) Yet it is obvious that Paul did not mean that sin was actually a person.” _Insight on the Scriptures_, 2:1019, bold emphasis added.

The above article seems to say very clearly that wisdom in Proverbs 8 “is not actually a person.” Yet elsewhere, of course, the same publishers argue that wisdom *is* a person. Such a claim is inconsistent with the fact, which the Watchtower has occasionally recognized, that the passage is employing the literary device known as personification.

PSALM 82:6 AND JOHN 10

JEROME H. NEYREY, SJ.

Biblical texts that called mortals “gods” attracted attention from commentators and became the focus of ingenious interpretations and exegetical principles. ^[1] This is certainly true of Ps 82:6, “I said: ‘You are Gods.'” The present study examines the use of Ps 82:6 in John 10:34-36. It is my hypothesis that the Fourth Gospel understands Psalm 82 very much the way it was understood in Jewish midrash, for which it might be the earliest extant example. An examination of the understanding and function of Ps 82:6 in John 10:34-36 will necessarily entail a survey of Jewish interpretations of that Psalm to put the Johannine passage in its proper perspective.

I. Status Questionis

In the 1960s, a debate emerged over the interpretation of Ps 82:6-7 in relation to John 10:34-36, the general lines of which were summarized by Anthony Hanson. ^[2] He called attention to four different ways in which Psalm 82 was understood in Jewish traditions, with reference to (a) angels, (b) Melchizedek, (c) judges, and (d) Israel at Sinai. All four interpretations are attested to in midrashic literature, but which one relates to John10:34-36?

Angels. In an early study on Psalm 82, J. A. Emerton ^[3] argued that in the targum to the Psalms, ^[4] Qumran, ^[5] the Peshitta, and the Fathers, elohim in Psalm 82 was understood to refer to “angels.” Emerton suggests that elohim refers to superhuman beings to whom the nations were allotted (e.g., Deut 4:19; Daniel 10), whom the Jewsregarded as angels but whom the Gentiles called gods (see 1 Cor 10:20).

Melchizedek In llQMelch, Psalm 82 was cited apropos of Melchizedek The modern editor of llQMelch described the document as an “eschatological midrash” which cast Melchizedek in the role of judge. ^[6] Emerton, who had argued that the “gods” mentioned in Psalm 82 were “angels,”‘ now saw the Melchizedek = Elohim reference in llQMelch strengthening his earlier interpretation of Psalm 82; he suggested that Melchizedek was being identified with the archangel Michael. ^[7]   Hanson conceded that Melchizedek might be called “god,” but rejected its relevance for John 10. ^[8]

Judges. Psalm 82 has also been interpreted in Jewish tradition to refer to the judges of Israel, evidence for which comes from b, Ber. 6a and Midr. Ps. 82. ^[9] This interpretation of the psalm enjoyed considerable popularity during a certain period of Johannine scholarship. ^[10] Returning to the issue of Melchizedek in llQMelch, Joseph Fitzmyer, ^[11] who basically agreed with van der Woude’s original interpretation of the passage, paraphrased line 10 of this fragment as follows: “Elohim (Melchizedek) has taken his stand in the assembly of El (Yahweh), in the midst of gods (angelic court) he gives judgment.” ^[12]   He understands Melchizedek’s role in that text not as an angel but as a judge. ^[13]

Israel at Sinai. As far back as Billerbeck, ^[14] it was argued that Ps 82:6-7 was historicized in Jewish traditions to refer to Israel at Sinai when Godgave it the Torah, making it holy and so deathless. This midrash, which has become a popular understanding of the use of Ps 82:6-7 in John 10:34-36, ^[15] implies that Israel experienced a new creation at Sinai.   Because Godgave Israel the word of Torah, to which it became obedient, Israel became deathless once more as it resumed the “image and likeness of God” given it at creation. James Ackerman, the chief proponent of this argument, suggested that the Johannine Prologue bears striking resemblances to the “Sinai myth,”‘ indicating how Wisdom once dwelt on earth with humankind (Ps 82:6), thus making them immortal; but because Wisdom was rejected and returned to heaven, sinful mortals now die (Ps 82:7). ^[16]

As regards these interpretations and John 10, Hanson rejected the traditions that interpret “god” as either angels or judges. ^[17] He correctly concluded that only the last interpretation of Psalm 82 (Israel at Sinai) has any bearing on the argument in John 10. ^[18] All of the studies cited above, however, are deficient forseveral reasons. First, they tend to argue foran extrinsic interpretation of Psalm 82 in John 10: if Jewsin their scriptures or tradition can call a man “god,” then Jesusis not totally out of line in being called a divine figure. ^[19] This type of extrinsic argument shows little respect forthe midrashic understanding of Psalm 82 or other texts fromscripture about the justification in the first place forcalling any human “god,” even by extension. Are there intrinsic reasons in the midrash on Psalm 82 which give warrant to such a predication? Second, those who treat the background of Psalm 82, even in passing, do not present an adequate exegesis of the argument in John 10 to see on what grounds Jesusis acclaimed “equal to God” (10:30, 33) and what Psalm 82 has to do with that argument- There are some commentators who deny that Psalm 82 in any way responds to the charges. ^[20] There is, then, much work left to be done. We turn now to a more detailed exegesis of John 10 to see what is being argued, so that we might assess more clearly the meaning and function of Psalm 82 in relation to that argument.

II. The Argument in John 10:28-37

Unless Psalm 82 is used in a purely extrinsic manner ^[21] in John 10:34-36, then we must investigate how it functions as an apology to a specific charge in the forensic dynamics of John 10. The starting place is 10:30, where Jesusclaims “I and the Father are one (or equal).”  The crowds correctly interpret this to mean that Jesus in some way claims “equality with God.” His claim leads them to a judgment, “blasphemy, because you, being a man, make yourself God” (10:33). Several questions arise: In what respect are Jesus and God “one” (or equal)? Is it true that Jesus “makes himself” God? This means that we must examine both the earlier part of John 10 to see in what sense Jesus and God are “equal” and the subsequent apology in 10:34-38 to see how Psalm 82 relates to the claims of equality.

The First Forensic Proceeding (10:1-28a)

After Jesus claimed to be the door and the shepherd (10:1-16), the Gospel describes confusion in the crowd about these claims: Is he a demon or a saint (10:19-21)? So intense is this popular confusion that a formal forensic process is begun in 10:22-27 about Jesus’ claims. Since the crowd, who is an uneducated ‘am ha-ares (7:47-49), could not possibly decide these claims, a solemn assembly gathers “in the temple, in the stoa of Solomon” (10:23). There it puts a formal question to Jesus: “Tell us plainly, if you are the Messiah?” (10:24). Thus, 10:1-28a can be seen as a forensic proceeding ^[22] which formally examines Jesus’ claims:

        Claim:              Jesus is the Door, Good Shepherd (10:1-16)

        Judgment:         Tell us plainly if you are the Christ? (10:24)           

        Apology:          Defense of Jesus as Shepherd (10:25-27)

Jesus’ defense of his claim contains no new material which proves its truth, but is itself a judgment on his judges, ^[23] an actual demonstration of how his claims work.

10:1-16                                                        10:27-28a

1. The (true) sheep hear                               1. My sheep hear

    his voice (10:3b)                                           my voice (10:27a)

2. 1 know my own                                       2. I know them (10:27b)

    and my own know me (10:14)

3. The sheep follow him, for                         3. And they follow me (10:27c)

    they know his voice (10:4)

By Jesus’ criteria of judgment, then, he proves that his judges are not his sheep nor is he their shepherd. According to the Gospel’s logic, these self-confessed non-sheep have rejected Jesus’ basic claims to be God’s agent and so are convicted of sin and unbelief (see John 3:18, 20; 5:40-45; 9:39-41; 12:46-48). Yet the forensic process is not yetfinished.

The Second Forensic Proceeding (10:28b-39)

In 10:28-30 Jesus makes newer and bolder claims Although formerly this Gospel claimed that believers by their own judgment come to life and pass beyond death (3:16-19; 5:24), now Jesus asserts that he himself is the giver of eternal life: “I give them eternal life and they never perish” (10:28a).  He asserts that “no one shall snatch them out of my hand” (10:28b). ^[24] Thus, Jesus now functions as the active agent of life, as giver of eternal life and as protector of his sheep even in death. Yet these claims would put him on a par with the all-powerful God.

10:29 states two things about God. First, God is “greater than all” ^[25] in virtue of God’s ruling or executive power as pantocrator, despotes, and basileus. ^[26] Second, of God it is said, “My Father…has given them [the sheep] to me and no one is able to snatch them out of the Father’s hand” (10:29). Concerning the latter remark, then, Jesus and God are alike, even equal.

Jesus (10:28)                                     The Father (10:29)

Igive them eternal life                          My Father…has given

and they shall not perish                       them to me

forever,

and no one shall snatch                     and no one is able to snatch

them out of my hand.                         them out of the Fathers hand.

To underscore the boldness of Jesus’ claims, the text emphasizes that “God is greater than all” (10:29b), thus raising God above all other creatures, be they of no power or great power. Yet Jesus claims that he is “equal to” God who is “greater than all,” when he draws the conclusion in 10:30, “I and the Father are hen.”

Literally hen means “one.” But the context suggests that this adjective be translated as “equal to” or “on a par with.” Jesus claims far more than mere moral unity with God, which was the aim of every Israelite; such moral unity would never mean that mortals had become “god;” as Jesus’ remark is understood in 10:31-33. The very argument in John, then, understands hen to mean more than moral unity, that is, “equality with God.” By way of confirmation, 1 Cor 3:7 indicates that hen can mean “equality.” ^[27] In virtue of the com­parison noted above, Jesus claims equality with God, who is “greater than all,” because there is “no snatching out of their hands.”  To what does this refer?

In the context of 10:28, Jesus claims both the power to give eternal life so that his sheep do not perish and the power to guard them from being snatched. “Being snatched,” then, has to do with life and death, such that Death ^[28] has no ultimate power over Jesus’ sheep. Conversely, this implies that Jesus has such power from God so that he is the one who gives eternal life and rescues the dead from the snares of Death (see John 5:25, 28-29; 6:39, 44, 54; 8:51; 11:25). Since God alone holds the keys of life and death, Jesus claims an extraordinary power which belongs exclusively to God. ^[29] There is substance, then, to the claim that Jesus and the Father are “equal” (10:30).

I have shown at great length that the Fourth Gospel clearly and formally argues that Jesus is “equal to God” (5:18; 10:33) because God has given him full eschatological power (5:21-29). ^[30]   God gave him power (1) to give eternal life (5:21; 10:28), (2) to judge (5:22, 27; 8:21-30), (3) to be honored as Lawmaker and Judge (5:23), (4) to have life in himself (5:26; 10:17-18), and (5) to raise the dead and judge them (5:28-29). In fact, 5:21-29, a summary of Jesus’ eschatological power, functions as a topic statement which the Gospel subsequently develops in chaps, 8, 10, and 11. ^[31]   The claims in 10:28-30, then, continue the exposition of Jesus’ full eschatological power.

Our exegesis of 10:22-30 yields the following information. A second forensic process begins in 10:28-30. Jesus is formally on trial, not just concerning whether he is “the Christ” (10:23-24), but especially about his claim to be “equal to God” (10:30, 33), The chief issue that is contested, moreover, concerns ultimate power over death, whereby Jesus is equal to God.

Claim:  “I and the Father are ‘one.’” (10:30, 33), i,e., power over death (10:28-30):

(a) “I givethem eternal life”

(b) “they do not perish forever“

(c) “no one snatches them out of my hand”

Judgment: “Blasphemy, because you, being a man, make yourself equal to God” (10:33)

Apology: Use of Ps 82:6 (10:34-36): their judgment is false, because God makes Jesus to be “Son of God”

Our focus necessarily turns to the apology in 10:34-36. How does the Fourth Gospel understand and use Psalm 82, and does this usage have any relationship to the claims made in 10:28-30? As we begin, let us pay special attention to the form of the charge in 10:33. Jesus is accused of “making himself” equal to God, a charge that dominates the many forensic proceedings against him:5:18            “…making himself God”10:33          “you, a man, make yourself God”19:7            “he made himself the son of God”19:12          “who makes himself king…” ^[32]

The evangelist distinguishes two elements of the judgment against Jesus: (1) Does Jesus make himself God or equal to God? (2) In what sense is Jesus equal to God or “god”? The distinction is important, for the Johannine Gospel denies the former half, that is, that Jesus makes himself anything, but care­fully explains and defends the assertion of his equality with God. ^[33]

Psalm 82 as Apologetic Response

In response to the charge of blasphemy, Jesus advances an argument from scripture using Psalm 82. When he cites Ps 82:6 in 10:34, he establishes the mode of argument by comparing two things: if scripture was not in error calling mortals “gods” (Ps 82:6), then neither is there error in calling the one whom God consecrated and sent into the world “the Son of God” (10:35-36).

Jesus’ reference to “Son of God” in 10:36 does not weaken the argument by reducing the claim from “god” to “son of God,” because if one continues reading Ps 82:6, the two terms are considered parallel and equivalent there (“I said, ‘You are gods, all of you, sons of the Most High‘”). ^[34]   In claiming to be the consecrated “Son of God,” he does not claim less than what is claimed by being “god” according to Ps 82:6. On the contrary, he claims more.

Yet how does the Fourth Gospel understand Ps 82:6? One stream of critical opinion takes the citation extrinsically, on a literal level as a mere play on words. If mortals, for whatever reason, can truly be called “gods” according to scripture, then the term is not a priori preposterously applied to Jesus. This type of explanation does not ask under what circumstances mortals might be called “gods,” and it sees Jesus basically engaging in an evasive maneuver.

Such reasoning, however, does not mesh with the Johannine perspective for several reasons. The Fourth Gospel always criticizes people who take things literally, either Jesus’ word or the scriptures. Regularly we find a pattern where Jesus makes a statement, which his hearers misunderstand because they take it on a literal level, which leads Jesus to issue a clarification which exposes the spiritual or inner meaning of his words. ^[35] It seems improbable, then, that the Fourth Gospel is dealing superficially with Psalm 82, asking readers to take its phrases and argument on a literal or extrinsic level. This is all the more true since the Gospel constantly maintains that spiritual vision is needed to see the inner meaning of texts from the scriptures which Jesus fulfills (see John 2:17, 22; 6:31; 8:56, 58, etc.).

A literal reading of Psalm 82, moreover, seems inconsistent with the more typical pattern of Johannine Christology. Wayne Meeks noted that when something claimed about Jesus causes a reaction from the synagogue, the Johannine community tends not to moderate its claim, but to rephrase it in such a way as to cause even greater offense. ^[36] Thus, if mortals may be called “god,” then Jesus, whom God consecrated and sent into the world, can be called “Son of God,” meaning “equal to God.” A purely extrinsic reading of Ps 82:6 in regard to John 10:34-36 hardly seems warranted.

How, then, does the Fourth Gospel understand and use Psalm 82? The chief clue to a special reading of Ps 82:6 lies in 10:35, when we observe the way the Gospel interprets Ps 82:6 as part of its argument: “If he called them ‘gods’ to whom the word of God came…” Whoever, then, is called “god” is so named because “the word of God came” to them. Scholars have long argued that this refers to Israel at Sinai when God gave it the Torah, which I think is absolutely correct. ^[37]   Yet what is the shape of the midrash on this and how might it apply to the Fourth Gospel?

B. F. Westcott, for example, argued that when the Fourth Gospel speaks of “those to whom the word of God came,” the evangelist refers to the preexistent Word who regularly gave theophanies to Israel’s patriarchs. ^[38]   Although the Fourth Gospel indeed develops an argument that Jesus is the appearing deity of the OT, ^[39] it is not apparent that an allusion is being made to that tradition in John 10, nor is it clear how such an allusion really advances the argument that Jesus is rightly called “god.” The evangelist, moreover, does not propose here the argument which was made in the prologue, that the “Word came unto his own and his own received him not” (1:11). ^[40]   Israel is not being reproached here for rejecting once more God’s revelation to it.

III. Ps 82:6 in Jewish Midrash

The emphasis in John 10:35 is not on Jesus, the preexistent Word, but on “those to whom the word of God came,” who are called “gods.”  Who were these people? Although it is not the only stream of interpretation of Ps 82:6-7 in Jewish literature, there is a clear sense that Ps 82:6-7 was understood in terms of Israel at the Sinai theophany. A second-century midrash goes as follows:

If it were possible to do away with the Angel of Death I would. But the decree has long ago been decreed. R. Jose says: It was upon this condition that the Israelites stood up before Mount Sinai, on the condition that the Angel of Death should have not power over them. For it is said: “I SAID: YE ARE GODS”(Ps 82:6). But you have corrupted your conduct. “SURELY YE SHALL DIE LIKE MEN“(Ps 82:7). ^[41]

Commentary: the occasion is Sinai (“Israel stood up before Mount Sinai”), when God descended on the mountain to give the Torah. According to Exod 20:18-19, when the Israelites saw the mountain blazing with lightning and heard the thundering, they said to Moses: “You speak to us, and we will hear; but let not God speak to us, lest we die.“In light of this, the Mekilta indicates that God restrained the Angel of Death, so that Israel did not die. And so because Israel became deathless, that is, beyond the power of the Angel of Death, Ps 82:6 applied to them, “I said ‘You are gods.’” Gods,then, because deathless.But with the worship of the golden calf, Israel sinned, and suffered once more the penalty for sin, which is death: “You shall die like men” (Ps 82:7).

An important variation of this midrash occurs in b. ‘Abod. Zar: 5a. The context is a discussion of Deut 5:25-26 where Israel received the Sinai revelation. The author comments that they have seen God and yet still live (recall the discussion of Exod 20:18-19 above); “therefore,” they ask, “why should we die?” This question becomes the occasion for comment about the fluctuating power of the Angel of Death.

R Jose said: The Israelites accepted the Torah only so that the Angel of Death should have no dominion over them, as it is said: “I SAID: YE ARE GODS AND ALL OF YOU SONS OF THE MOST HIGH”(Ps 82:6). Now that you have spoilt your deeds, “YE SHALL DIE LIKE MORTALS‘(Ps 82:7). ^[42]

Commentary: the occasion is Sinai; Israel is once again called god because deathless. But now we find the explicit note that being called god and being deathless are linked to the reception of Torah. In fact, Israel chooses God’s Torah for the express purpose that the Angel of Death should not have power over it. Something else, then, is operative here which suggests that receiving God’s word (Torah) makes one holy, and if holy, then sinless, and if sinless, then deathless.

A third early midrash can help to clarify the basic lines of this interpretation of Ps 82:6-7. The context is a reflection on Deut 32:20, “I will see what their end will be,” which is seen referring to a fickle, perfidious people.

You stood at Mount Sinai and said, “All that the Lord hath spoken will we do, and obey” (Exod 24:7), (whereupon) “I SAID: YE ARE GODS‘ (Ps 82:6); but when you said to the (golden) calf, “This is thy god, 0Israel” (Exod 32:4), Isaid to you,“NEVERTHELESS, YE SHALL DIE LIKE MEN” (Ps 82:7). ^[43]

Commentary: at Sinai Israel received God’s word of Torah (“all that the Lord hath spoken”) and became holy and sinless (“…we will do and obey”), for which reason they are called gods. Although it is not explicitly stated here, this argument assumes that holiness leads to deathlessness, which is a godlike quality, for which reason Israel is called god. Yet with Israel’s new sin comes death, the typical fate of sinful mortals (“ye shall die like men”).

The basic lines of the midrashic understanding of Ps 82:6-7, then, are clear. When Israel at Sinai received God’s Torah and obeyed, this led to genuine holiness which resulted in deathlessness; hence, Israel could be called god because deathless. But when disobedient and sinful, Israel deserved the wages of sin, that is, death; hence, Israel could be called man.

Yet this type of argument presumes some biblical understanding of death and deathlessness as well as of the nature of humanity and God. In short, the link between obedience-holiness-deathlessness lies back in the Genesis exposition of Adam in God’s “image and likeness,” ^[44] an implicit scenario made explicit in the following midrash. The segment is somewhat long, but because of its importance and the complicated argument in it, it deserves to be cited as fully as possible.

R. Eleazar b. R. Jose the Galilean remarked: The Angel of Death com­plained to the Holy One, blessed be He: ‘I have then been created in the world to no purpose!’ The Holy One, blessed be He, replied: ‘I have created you in order that you shall destroy idol-worshippers, but not this people, for you have no jurisdiction over them.’ That they should live and endure for ever; as it says, “But ye that did cleave unto the Lord your God are alive every one of you” (Deut 4:4). In the same strain it says, “The writing was the writing of God, graven (haruth) upon the tables” (Exod 32:16). What is the signification of “haruth”? R. Judah says: Freedom (heruth) from foreign governments; R. Nehemiah says: From the Angel of Death; and Rabbi says: From suffering. See then the plan the Holy One, blessed be He, had made for them! Yet forthwith they frustrated the plan after forty days. Accordingly it says, “But ye have set at nought all my counsel” (Prov 1:25). The Holy one, blessed be He, said to them: ‘I thought you would not sin and would live and endure for ever like Me; even as I live and endure for ever and to all eternity; I SAID: YE ARE GODS, AND ALL OF YOU SONS OF THE MOST HIGH (Ps 82:6), like the ministering angels, who are immortal. Yet after all this greatness, you wanted to die! INDEED, YE SHALL DIE LIKE MEN (Ps 82:7)–Adam, i.e. like Adam whom Icharged with one commandment which he was to perform and live and endure for ever’; as it says, “Behold the man was as one of us” (Gen 3:22). Similarly, “And God created man in His own image” (Gen 1:27), that is to say, that he should live and endure like Himself. Yet [says God] he corrupted his deeds and nullified My decree. For he ate of the tree, and I said to him: “For dust thou art” (Gen 3:19). So also in your case, “I SAID YE ARE GODS;” but you have ruined yourselves like Adam, and so “INDEED, YE SHALL DIE like Adam” (Num Rab. 16.24) ^[45]

The typical features of the midrashic understanding of Ps 82:6-7 are clearly evident: (a) Sinai and the giving of the Torah, (b) Israel’s obedience (“cleaving unto the Lord”), (c) deathlessness or immortality (“freedom from the Angel of Death” ..”live and endure for ever like Me”), and hence (d) Israel being called god (Ps 82:6). This midrash makes explicit the generally assumed doctrine of the relation of sin and death found primarily in Genesis 1-3, for it points out that God created Adam “in His image and likeness,” that is, deathless. Adam was deathless because holy and obedient (“I charged with one commandment which he was to perform and live and endure for ever”). Adam died precisely because he sinned and lost God’s holiness and “image.” This midrash also makes clear that interpreters of Ps 82:6-7 saw Sinai as a new creation, when the obedience, holiness, and deathlessness of Adam were restored to Israel, thus linking the Adam myth with the Sinai myth, as the following diagram suggests.

    Adam in Paradise                                 Israel at Sinai

1. created in holiness                              1. reconstituted in holiness

2. and so deathless                                 2. and so deathless,

3  yet sinned (ate fruit)                            3. yet sinned (worshiped calf)

4. and so died,                                        4. and so died.

The midrashim we are examining all presume a complex yet traditional explanation of the source of death. Good biblical doctrine states that God created Adam in a state of holiness. He was, moreover, created in God’s “image and likeness,” which Wisdom 2:23 explains as a state of deathlessness: ^[46]God made man for incorruptionand made him in the image of his own eternity.

Deathlessness (or “eternity”) was conditioned upon holiness. God said, “On the day you eat it you shall die” (Gen 2:17; 3:3). The tempter deceived Eve that if she broke God’s commandment “You shall not die” (Gen 3:5), which was a lie; for of the sinful Adam God said, “You are dust and to dust you shall return” (Gen 3:19).

Although we have surveyed only four instances of the midrashic understanding of Psalm 82, many more can be found in Jewish literature. Yet as we investigate those other citations of Psalm 82, they only confirm what has just been shown. In general, it can be stated that when Psalm 82 is cited in Jewish midrash, writers generally understand that Israel is called god because of its holiness and/or its deathlessness. ^[47]

Evidently some midrashim contain a fully developed exposition of the Psalm, while others have but fragments of an explanation. Yet even the earliest midrash cited above, the Mekilta, implies as much as it states, probably because it reflects a very common tradition which is presumably well known. Not all of the elements of the midrash, moreover, need be explicitly mentioned when the Psalm is interpreted, for midrash is like an iceberg. As much is implied as is visible. With this survey of midrashic interpretation of Ps 82:6 in mind, we return to John 10:34-36. Does the Fourth Gospel interpret Psalm 82 in a midrashic manner, and, if so, how much of the midrash does it know and use?

IV. Midrash in John 10:34-36

If the Fourth Gospel understands Psalm 82 in a midrashic manner, we would want to see where John 10:34-36 stands in regard to three issues which regularly arise in the midrashim. First, the historical occasion of Psalm 82 is regularly seen to be Israel’s reception of God’s word at Sinai. Second, the midrash on Psalm 82 does not call Israel gods for purely extrinsic reasons, but links godlikeness with deathlessness and/or holiness. Finally, even the simple midrash assumes some biblical notion of death and deathlessness, which implies an understanding of Genesis 1-3 or some popular myth of the origin of death in the world. With these points in mind let us return to John 10.

As we noted above, the Fourth Gospel seems to understand Psalm 82 in a midrashic sense as referring to Israel at Sinai. For the evangelist interprets the content of “I said, ‘You are gods’” apropos of “those to whom the word of God came” (10:34-35). People, then, are not called god gratuitously, for there is intrinsic content to the predication. The Fourth Gospel does not explicitly state that “gods…those to whom the word of God came” refers to Israel’s deathlessness, but only to its holiness in virtue of an obedient hearing of Torah. Although deathlessness is not explicitly mentioned in 10:34, I would argue that it is assumed in the link between holiness and godlikeness. After all, it is not the mere physical hearing of the Word of God, but hearing in faith and obedience which constitutes holiness. Such is the hearing that is celebrated in John 5:24; 8:37; 9:27. This Gospel clearly sees an intrinsic link between hearing in faith and passing to eternal life. Nevertheless, John 10:34-36 does not explicitly link godlikeness with deathlessness, but only with holiness.

The focus on holiness, moreover, continues in the application of Ps 82:6 to Jesus in 10:36. If Israel, who became holy, may be called god,then it is not blasphemy if Jesus, whom God consecrated and sent as his apostle into the world, is called god and Son of God.Holiness or sinlessness again serves as the ground for calling someone, Israel or Jesus, god.

Throughout the Fourth Gospel. Jesus’ holiness or sinfulness has been a formal topic of debate. As regards his alleged sinfulness, the Gospel repeatedly takes note of the popular judgment of Jesus as a sinner (9:16, 24), a judgment based on his two healings on the sabbath (5:1-17; 9:1-7). His enemies, moreover, charge him with being thoroughly evil, that is, possessed of a demon (7:20; 8:48; 10:20). Here in 10:33 and 36 he is charged with a new sin, blasphemy, for claiming to be “equal to God.”

In the face of these accusations, the Fourth Gospel denies any sin on Jesus’ part. John 10:36 represents but the most recent evidence of this defense, as it proclaims that God consecrated Jesus. After all, God’sjudgment of Jesus must surely have greater weight than that of his peers (see 5:31-46). We have, moreover, heard of God’s evaluation of Jesus elsewhere, that “The Father loves the Son” (3:35; 5:30). Sinners, of course, find no place in God’s presence, yet Jesus was “face to face” with God (1:1-2) and in God’s “bosom” (1:18). And Jesus will return to God’s presence at the completion of his mission (13:3; 17:5, 24). God, then, judges Jesus to be sinless and worthy to stand in the divine presence.

Nor could anyone convict Jesus of sin (8:46). His working on the sabbath constituted no breach of God’s law, but must be perceived precisely as obedience to God’s will (5:31; 7:21-23). In fact, Jesus’ very ability to open the eyes of the blind testifies to his closeness to God (9:31-33). Jesus’ holiness (6:69) and his consecration (10:36) attest to his preeminent sinlessness or holiness.

Divine consecration of Jesus, moreover, suggests a picture of him as one totally set aside forGod’s purposes ^[48] and completely obedient to God’s will. This radical image of commissioning evoked for Rudolf Schnackenburg the sense of a person sealed with the Holy Spirit, ^[49] a comment that makes us recall the testimony of the Baptizer in 1:30-31. John testified that he saw God’s Spirit not only descend on Jesus but “remain on him” (1:32-33), which suggests that divine power and holiness were no passing phenomenon for Jesus. Because of the dwelling of the Holy Spirit on Jesus, John testifies that he is “the Son of God” (1:34), a figure whose task was to purify others with the Spirit which remained in him (1:33).  Jesus, then, is no sinner, but God’s Holy One.

Thus far we have noted that 10:34-35 understands Ps 82:6 to mean that obedience to God’s word leads to holiness and godlikeness. As we saw with the midrashim, this interpretation presumes some notion of deathlessness linked with holiness. Yet it is important to pay attention to where and how Ps 82:6 functions in the forensic structure of 10:28-36. The Fourth Gospel uses Psalm 82 as a refutation of part of the charge. Jesus’ judges judged wrongly when they accused him of making himself god or equal to God, because God Himself makes Jesus Son of God, just as God mode Israel “god” by delivering the Torah to it. At a minimum, then, Jesus refutes the essence of the charge by maintaining that God makes him what he is, namely, a consecrated servant, agent, and apostle, a person totally set apart by God forsacred duty. ^[50]    The apology based on Psalm 82, then, argues two things:  it refutes the charge that Jesus makes himself “Sonof God,” even as it affirms his radical holiness against the charge of blasphemy. But if it confounds his accusers (10:31-33), does it explain or support the claims made in 10:28-30 which precipitated the forensic controversy in the first place?

We claimed above that Jesus is “equal to God” because of his “power over death.” In regard to this, Ps 82:6 does not seem to play a significant part.

         Claim:      Equal to God: power over death (10:28-30)

         Judgment:  Blasphemy, you a man, make yourself a god (10:33)

         Apology:   Charge refuted: it is God who makes Jesus “Son of God” because

                          of his holiness (Ps 82:6//John 10:34-36)

Ps 82:6, then, functions in a limited way; it proves the judges’ judgment is false, but it hardly pertains to the substance of Jesus’ claims in 10:28-30. Psalm 82, moreover, would not be a satisfactory explanation for Jesus’ “equality with God” according to the Fourth Gospel. Even when made deathless, Israel always remained less than God, merely mortal; the Angel of Death might still have power over them. Of Jesus, however, this Gospel claims that he is no mere mortal, but a divine figure. He has power over the Angel of Death, not vice versa. Ps 82:6 may function to prove the judges’ judgment wrong (he does not “make himself” anything; God makes him “Son of God”), but it is not exploited as an adequate explanation for the Johannine assertion that Jesus has power over death (10:28-30). Ps 82:6 functions only to prove that the judges’ judgment is false.

What then of the forensic claims themselves? Jesus and God are “equal” in terms of power over death. Yet is Jesus himself deathless? Whence comes his power over death? Friend and foe both know that he died on the cross. Friends proclaim that his death was God’s will and plan (Acts 2:23; 4:28) and that he was fully obedient to God, even unto death (Phil 2:8; Mark 14:35-36). The Fourth Gospel, moreover, proclaims a more remarkable thing about God’s involvement in Jesus’ death. In 10:17-18 Jesus asserts that God loves him precisely because he dies: “For this reason the Father loves me, that Ilay down my life, that I may take it again” (10:17). Death is usually a sign of God’s wrath, not love. Jesus’ death, then, is clearly not the result of sin, as the midrash on Ps 82:7 argues. Nor is Jesus the helpless victim whose life is taken from him, either by men or the Angel of Death. For, as he declares, “No one takes it from me, but Ilay it down of my own accord” (10:18a). Furthermore, his death occurs in strict obedience to God, not as punishment for sinfulness on his part: “This commandment Ihave received from my Father (10:18b). In 10:28-30, moreover, Jesus claims to be equal to God in having God’s own power over death. Jesus, then, while not literally deathless himself, has full power over death.

Indisputably Jesus dies, but the Fourth Gospel steadfastly maintains that Jesus has power over death, both the death of his followers and his own. We noted earlier how this Gospel proclaims that Jesus has God’s eschatological power to the full, one aspect of which is to “give life” to others (5:21; 10:28) and to “raise the dead” (5:25, 28-29; 11:25). Yet Jesus has power over his own death, to lay down his life and to take it back (10:17-18); this power was received when God gave him to “have life in himself” (5:26), just as God has life in Himself. And so Jesus is proclaimed deathless in a special way: although he dies, he has complete power over death, his own and that of his followers. He raises himself from death to life and he raises his followers from death as well.

Ps 82:6 in the midrashim explains deathlessness, but in a way that is not adequate to the claims made in the Fourth Gospel about Jesus’ power over death. For this reason, I suggest, the evangelist did not employ the full midrashic understanding of Psalm 82 which was available to him.

IV. Conclusions and Further Questions

In summary, John 10:34-36 can be said to understand Ps 82:6 and use it in specific ways. (1) According to 10:34-35, Ps 82:6 (“I said, ‘You are gods’”) is understood to refer to Israel at Sinai when it received the Torah (“to whom the word of God came,” 10:35). (2) Implied in this understanding is the intimate link between holiness :: deathlessness :: godlikeness. The Fourth Gospel cites only an abbreviated form of this, holiness ::  godlikeness (3) Ps 82:6b (“sons of the Most High”) is cited by Jesus when he calls himself “Son of God” (10:36), and it refers to his godlikeness in terms of holiness (see “consecrated and sent”). (4) Ps 82:6 does not touch the substance of the claims made in 10:28-30 which precipitated the forensic process in 10:31-39. It functions as an adequate refutation of the erroneous judgment of Jesus’ judges, who charged that he, “a man, makes himself equal to God,” This judgment is false because God makes him “Son of God.” (5) According to the apology in 10:34-36, holiness is linked with godlikeness in ways that are appropriate to human beings, first Adam, then Israel. Jesus would be a mere human being even if acclaimed “god/Son of God,” as was Israel. But the forensic argument in John 10 claims much more. No mere human being, Jesus is a heavenly figure who is “equal to God.” His equality rests not on holiness but on divine powers intrinsic to him, that is, full eschatological power.

(6) Jesus’ claims in regard to power over death always remain important in John 10. In this Gospel, his deathlessness ^[51] does not formally derive from sinlessness/holiness as in the case of the midrash onPs 82:6, but from full eschatological power which God gave him over death (5:21-29; 10:17-18). In 5:18 and 10:30, Jesus may be called “equal to God” for a much greater reason than ever justified calling Israel god, namely, because of powers intrinsic to him. Power over death is the specific content of “equal to God.”

(7) If we are correct that Ps 82:6 is understood in 10:34-36 in line with its basic midrashic interpretation, then the remark in 10:28-29 that “no one shall snatch them out of my hand” probably echoes what the midrash dis­cusses in terms of the Angel of Death whose power over God’s people was restrained. The Angel of Death will not snatch Jesus’ followers/sheep either from his hand or God’s hand. (8) Although the midrashim studied above were written considerably later than the Fourth Gospel, the understanding of Ps 82:6 in John 10:34-36 belongs in that same trajectory of interpretation. It might be the earliest extant witness of that tradition, although not the most complete example.

This study has not by any means exhausted the inquiry into John 10:31-39. But it does raise new questions. It focuses onthe formal forensic process which structures the narrative in 10:21-28a and 28b-39, highlighting especially the claims made by Jesus. The use of Psalm 82 in 10:34-36 only deflects the judges’ false judgment; a full exposition of Jesus’ claims in 10:28-30 and their adequate apology in 10:37-38 remains to be examined.  The relationship of 10:28b-30 to issues of Jesus’ eschatological power in 5:21-29; 8:21-59; 11:1-41 remains to be considered.

The use of midrashic traditions is not confined to 10:34-36. ^[52]   Appreciation of John’s use not only of the scriptures but especially their midrashic understanding will go a long way toward clarifying the context of the Johannine community. Finally, if there is substance to the argument about two forensic processes narrated in 10:21-28a, 28b-39, this might provide further clues to the historical development of the Johannine community. It would stand as another piece of evidence for a development from a “low” Christology (“Messiah”) to “high” Christology (“equal to God”). ^[53]

Notes

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^[1] For example, Exod 7:1, where God says to Moses, “I make you as god to Pharaoh.” This caused no 1ittle difficulty to Philo, as he wrestled with its interpretation in Leg All. 1.40; Sac. 9; Det. 39-40, 161-62; Migr. 84, 169; Mut. 19-20, 125, 128-29; Somn. 2.189; Quod Omn. 43-44;  see also Post. 43-44 and Vit. Mos. 1.158.

^[2] Anthony Hanson, “John’s Citation of Psalm LXXXII Reconsidered,” NTS 13 (1966-67) 363-67.

^[3] J. A. Emerton, “Some NewTestament Notes,” JTS II (1960) 329-32.

^[4] See Luis Diez Merino, Targum de Salmos (Biblio Poliglota Complutense IV,1; Madrid: Instituto Francisco Suarez, 1982) 142 and 269.

^[5] See John Strugnell, “The Angelic Liturgy at Qumran-4QSerek Sirot ‘Olat Hassabbat,” in Congress Volume: Oxford 1959 (VTSup 7; Leiden: Brill, 1960) esp. 336-42.

^[6] The original study was by A.S. van der Woude, “Melchisedek als himmlische Erloser­gestalt in den neugefundenen eschatologischen Midraschim aus Qumran Hohle XI,” in Oudtestamentliche Studien XIV (Leiden: Brill, 1965) 354-73; see also Marinus de Jonge and A.S. van der Woude, “11QMelchizedek and the New Testament,” NTS 12 (1965-66) 304.

^[7] J. A. Emerton, “Melchizedek and the Gods: Fresh Evidence for the Jewish Background of John X.34-36,” JTS 17 (1966) 400-401.

^[8] Hanson, “John’s Citation of Psalm LXXXII Reconsidered,” 366.

^[9] See W. G. Braude, The Midrash on the Psalms (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959) 2. 59-60.

^[10] For example, B. F. Westcott, The Gospel According to St John (London: John Murray, 1908) 70; M.-J. Lagrange, Evangile selon Saint Jean (Paris: Gabalda, 1948) 290; and R. H. Lightfoot, St John’s Gospel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956) 209.

^[11] Joseph A. Fitzmyer, “Further Light on Melchizedek from Qumran Cave 11,” JBL 86 (1967) 25-41, which is also found in his Essays on the Semitic Background of the New Testament (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1974) 245-67.

^[12] Ibid., 261-62.

^[13] Ibid., 251-53.

^[14] See Str-B, 2. 543.

^[15] For example, see C. K. Barrett, The Gospel According to St. John (2d ed.; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1978) 384-85; and Nils Dahl, “The Johannine Church and History,” in Jesus in the Memory of the Early Church (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976) 109-10.

^[16] See James Ackerman, “The Rabbinic Interpretation of Psalm 82 and the Gospel of John,” HTR 59 (1966) 186-91.

^[17] Not all agree with Hanson; forexample, see E. Jungkuntz, “An Approach to the Exegesis of John 10:34-36,” CTM 35 (1964) 556-65.

^[18] This interpretation has already been urged; see James Ackerman, “Rabbinic Interpreta­tion;” 186-91.

^[19] Jungkuntz summarizes how many modern commentators see the use of Psalm 82 either in an ad hominem argument or consider it simply irrelevant to the narrative’s claims (“An Approach to the Exegesis of John 10:34,” 556-58).

^[20] For example, Rudolf Bultmann, The Gospel of John(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971) 389.

^[21] That is, “a play on words”; see, e.g. A. Loisy, Le quatrieme Evangile (Paris: Emil Nourry, 1921) 335.

^[22] Some suggestions have been made about the relationship of John 10:22-39 and the trial before the Sanhedrin in the Synoptic Gospels, but no analysis has been made of the Johannine passage in terms of the formal elements of a forensic proceeding; see Paul Winter, “Luke xxii 66b-71,” ST 9 (1955) 112-15; Raymond Brown, The Gospel According to John(AB 29; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966) 1. 404-6; and Rudolf Schnackenburg, The Gospel According to St. John (New York: Crossroad, 1982) 2. 306. On forensic process in John, see J. H. Neyrey, “Jesus the Judge: Forensic Process in John 8,21-59,” Bib 68 (1987) 509-41.

^[23] It is vintage Johannine argument to turn a judgment against Jesus into a judgment against his accusers (e.g., 5:31-46; 3:6-12); see J. H. Neyrey, “John III-A Debate over Johannine Epistemology and Christology,” NT 23 (1981) 117-18. Often “judgment” in the Fourth Gospel is self-judgment, so that if people judge Jesus incorrectly, they judge themselves.

^[24] Robert Aytoun pointed out that 10:28-30 bears striking resemblance to John 17:12 (“No One Shall Snatch Them Out of My Hand,” ExpTim 31 [1919-20] 475-76). While there are clear parallels, Aytoun did not notice that 10:28-30 speaks about Jesus’ power over death, but 17:12 speaks about protecting the disciples from death–two quite different issues.

^[25] C. K. Barrett dealt convincingly with the textual issue here (Gospel, 381-82); see also J. Birdsall, “John X.29,” JTS 11 (1960) 342-44.

^[26] See J. Whittaker, “A Hellenistic Context for John 10,29,” VC 24 (1970) 241-44.

^[27] See J. Bernard, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to St. John (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1926) 366; and Barnabas Lindars, The Gospel of John (London: Oliphants, 1972) 370.

^[28] One recalls how Paul personifies Death in Romans when he speaks of “Death reigned” (5:14,17,21).

^[29] Jewish lore notes that God gave Elijah, Elisha, and Ezekiel the key to three things that are exclusively in God’s power, viz., the key to rain, the womb, and the grave; see b. Ta’an.2a; b. Sanh. 113a; Midr. Ps. 78.5; see also Barrett, Gospel,260.

^[30] See J. H. Neyrey, An Ideology of Revolt: John’s Christology in Social-Science Perspective (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988) 9-93: a precis of this can be found in “‘My Lord and My God’: TheDivinity of Jesus in John’s Gospel,” Society of Biblical Literature 1986 Seminar Papers (ed. K. H. Richards; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986) 154-59.

^[31] See Neyrey, An Ideology of Revolt,33-34.

^[32] See Heb 5:5. The substance of this charge is best understood from the perspective of cultural anthropology, which would describe Mediterranean culture in terms of “honor” and “shame”; Jesus’ peers interpret his remarks as claims to very great honor, claims that seem vain-­glorious for a person who has never studied (John 7:15); see Bruce J Malina, The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology(Atlanta: John Knox, 1981) 27-33.

^[33] In John 5:19-29, for example, the Fourth Gospel rejects the assertion that Jesus “makes himself” anything; see Neyrey, An Ideology of Revolt,20-22.

^[34] See Brown, Gospel, 1. 409.

^[35] On this form in the Fourth Gospel, see Herbert Leroy, Ratsel und Misverstandnis (Bonn: Peter Hanstein, 1968) 45-47, 53-67; and Neyrey, An Ideology of Revolt, 42-43.

^[36] Wayne Meeks, “The Man from Heaven In Johannine Sectarianism,” JBL 91 (1972) 70-71.

^[37] I hasten to add that John 5:37, which alludes to the Sinai theophany, denies that Israel actually saw God: “His (God’s) voice you have never heard, His form you have never seen.” This text basically argues the repeated claim in the Fourth Gospel that no one has ever seen God (3:13; 6:46); it functions to diminish the authority of Israel’s previous revealers, such as Moses, Elijah, Abraham, and the prophets, by replacing them with Jesus, the unique revealer of God (1:18). Such anargument does not deny that theophanies indeed took place in Israel’s history, but rather that it was Jesus, the revealing deity, who appeared in them (see 8:58; 12:41). Although I claim that 10:34-35 refers to Israel’s reception of Torah at Sinai, this interpretation is not contradicted by 5:37 because the two passages are arguing quite different points.

^[38] Westcott, Gospel, 70; a modern version of this is argued by A. T. Hanson, “John’s Citation of Psalm Ixxxii.  John x.33-6,” NTS 11 (1965-66) 158-62.

^[39] See J. H. Neyrey, “Jacob Allusions in John 1:51,” CBQ 44 (1982) 589-94.

^[40] For this type of argument, see R. H. Lightfoot, St. John’s Gospel,208.

^[41] Mekilta de-Rabbi Ishmael,Tractate Bahodesh 9 (trans.Jacob Lauterbach; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society ofAmerica, 1933) 2. 272.

^[42] Trans. I. Epstein, The Babylonian Talmud (London: Soncino Press, 1935) 19.

^[43] Sifre: A Tannaitic Commentary on the Book of Deuteronomy, Piska 320 (trans. Reuven Hammer; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) 329.

^[44] On this point, see Jacob Jervell, Imago Dei (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960) 103, 113-19. As Jervell noted, Gen 1:26 (“image and likeness of God”) played a  more implicit role in the explanations of deathlessness; the more frequently cited text in this regard was Gen 3:22 (“the man has become like one of us”).

^[45] The translation is from Midrash Rabbah (H. Freedman and M. Simon; London: Soncino Press, 1939).

^[46] See Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, “Christological Anthropology in Phil., II, 6-11,” RB 82 (1976) 31-37.

^[47] Besides the three examples cited, other instances of the use of Ps 82:6 would include: Exod. Rab. 32:7; Lev. Rab. 4.1 and 11.3; Num. Rab. 16:24; Pirqe R. El. 47; Pesiq. R. 1.2; 14.10; 33.10; Tanhuma B Lev 7:5; Pesiq. Rab. Kah. 4; Eliyyahu Zuta 4; Eliyyahu Rabbah 24.

^[48] So Barrett, Gospel,385.

^[49] Schnackenburg, Gospel, 2. 311.

^[50] See Peder Borgen, “God’s Agent in the Fourth Gospel,” in Religions in Antiquity (ed. Jacob Neusner; Leiden: Brill, 1968) 137-48; and more recently George W. Buchanan, “Apostolic Christology,” Society of Biblical Literature 1986 Seminar Papers (ed. K. H. Richards; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986) 172-82.

^{[51] The Fourth Gospel has very conflicting material about “deathlessness.”  Concerning disciples, one might literally take statements such as 3:16; 5:24; 6:50, 54 to mean that true disciples do not die; some characters in the narrative are said to believe just this (8:51-53; 11:21, 32). It is even suggested that the Beloved Disciple would not die (21:23). Yet the Gospel seems to have quickly corrected that literal reading of Jesus’ words. Concerning Jesus himself, however, his followers could never claim “deathlessness” for him, given his evident demise on the cross. Yet they did claim that he overpowered death (8:28; 13:1-3). His resurrection from death is seen as his own act of power (10:17-18), thus affirming his power over death, if not deathlessness itself in another form}

^[52] For example, concerning the Johannine use of midrashic traditions about Jacob, see J. H. Neyrey, “Jacob Traditions and the Interpretation of John 4:10-26,” CBQ 41 (1979) 419-37.

^[53] See J. Louis Martyn, “Glimpses into the History of the Johannine Community,” in his The Gospel of John in Christian History (New York: Paulist, 1979) 90-121.